Is there a place for psychedelics in philosophy? I set out in 2005 to conduct anthropological fieldwork on the revival of hallucinogen research since the 1990s, which was the decade that US President George H. W. Bush had dedicated to research on the brain and to education in brain science. 1 I was prepared to address a series of widely recognized questions of epistemology and ontology, but my project was motivated by what William James would have called "live questions" -the sort of question that no philosophy seminar would ever discuss. When I had first taken LSD, at age eighteen, I experienced symptoms of psychosis but also a mystical sense of finally being at home in the world. Can a drug-induced experience be spiritually meaningful? As a youthful but staunch materialist, I did not know what to make of an experience that I would have felt ashamed to describe in religious terms.
this prompt, I took my confusion to neuropsychopharmacology laboratories in Switzerland and California. I can refer readers interested in this ethnographic bildungsroman to my book Neuropsychedelia, but in this essay I would like to connect the dots between that book and my current research, which concerns neurophilosophy. 3 This research is a different kind of "fieldwork in philosophy" than Rabinow's, closer in some ways to Pierre Bourdieu's, in that it submits an area of academic philosophy to anthropological inquiry. 4 During the time of my fieldwork in Franz X. Vollenweider's neuropsychopharmacology and brain imaging laboratory in Zurich, I was a graduate student in an American anthropology department, but Vollenweider treated me less as a social scientist than as a philosophical interlocutor with whom he could develop his own more speculative ideas about the effects of psychedelic drugs. I sat up and took notice when I first heard that he exchanged ideas as well with a professor of philosophy. At the 2006 LSD Symposium in Basel, Vollenweider introduced me to Thomas Metzinger, arguably Germany's most prominent neurophilosopher.
Metzinger's interest in hallucinogenic drugs differed sharply from, but was also related to, the other form of philosophical thought that I encountered in the field, Aldous Huxley's perennial philosophy. I will relate Huxley's rearticulation of this simultaneously early and nonmodern philosophy of religion to Metzinger's distinctly modern philosophy of mind, which he has used to reanimate the ancient conception of philosophy as a cultivation of the soul. To give away the answer to the question that I posed at the outset: yes, there can be and there already is a very small place for psychedelics in philosophy, on which we could build by bringing perennial philosophy into conversation with empirically oriented forms of research, such as neurophilosophy and ethnographic fieldwork on "consciousness cultures."
Hallucinogens, Neurophilosophy, and Cultura Animi Metzinger considers himself an analytic philosopher but works in a tradition of neurophilosophy that does not limit itself to conceptual analysis, instead opening up the philosophy of mind to experimental psychology and brain research.
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as an umbrella term covering Metzinger's project as well. In comparison with Metzinger's, however, the empirical orientation that Churchland has developed with her husband, Paul, is a more cerebral affair -an outcome of the couple's shared love of science. In Anglo-American philosophy departments, the Churchlands had to overcome significant intellectual resistance at a time when ordinary-language philosophy was just beginning to lose its predominance. Since experimental psychologists had been driven out of German academic philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century, the opposition to any form of "psychologism" has been deeply rooted on both sides of the Atlantic. 6 By contrast, Metzinger's interest in mind and brain is not a product of the seminar room but grew out of his participation in the counterculture of 1970s Frankfurt, which experimented with numerous consciousness-altering techniques, from meditation to psychedelic drugs. Politically, however, the radical Left to which Metzinger belonged opposed any form of "biologism" because of its association with Nazi ideology. Disenchanted with the pipe dreams of his milieu, Metzinger eventually set out to establish a naturalistic perspective on human beings.
I point to the opposition that both Churchland and Metzinger had to overcome to suggest why psychedelic drugs have failed to find a place in academic philosophy. As mind-altering drugs, their experimental uses are already making a modest contribution to a neurobiologically informed philosophy of mind.
But epistemological and political objections to "psychologism" and "biologism" continue to be prevalent in the discipline and are bound to impede the reception of psychopharmacological studies of hallucinogenic drugs, just as they frustrate interest in every other neuroscience literature. 7 Besides facing hostility from outside the discipline, neurophilosophy is struggling with internal problems as well. An effort to establish continuity between empirical facts and conceptual frameworks must negotiate the epistemological hurdles that ordinary-language philosophers have long emphasized, and there are also practical difficulties of interdisciplinary exchange. 8 Vollenweider told me that Metzinger was interested in some of the same questions as he himself was; for example, to what extent we construct and simulate the world. Is the trip only a hallucination? Vollenweider said he would have been proud to help the philosopher "operationalize" these questions. Historically, (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003) .
the idea of "operationalizing" philosophical problems traces back to a positivist theory of meaning that logical empiricists used to reduce the meaning of theoretical expressions to empirically verifiable observation sentences. In practice, however, philosophical theorizing and neuroscientific experimentation do not always work well together. As Metzinger put it in an interview with me: "In general, my experience with neuroscientists is that they say: Thomas, philosophy is very nice,
but tell us what we should do. Then I propose an experiment to them, and they say: No, for technical reasons that doesn't work. Nine out of ten times, that's how it goes." Vollenweider was equally self-critical: "I often wonder whether we aren't an intensification of subjective experience from the production of knowledge of the outside world (for example, colors can be brighter than anything we can see with our eyes). In this experimental situation, the phenomenal content is decoupled from the intentional content of experience, that is, from its directedness at an object. This phenomenon allows Metzinger's philosophy of mind to underpin, with empirical evidence, the otherwise purely speculative conceptual distinction between phenomenal and intentional content.
Although Metzinger acknowledges that hallucinogen-based psychotherapy can bring significant insights to therapists and patients, his discussion focuses on the hallucinatory component of the psychedelic experience, which he describes seeing is knowing would make his colleagues more susceptible to his more radical theoretical claim that all experience is fundamentally hallucinatory.
Metzinger's Being No One is a philosophically provocative but not an edifying book. Almost seven hundred pages of dense jargon and detailed discussion of neuroscientific and psychiatric studies express the aspiration of analytic philosophy to turn the love of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) into a professionalized and highly technical academic discipline. Pierre Hadot, familiar to readers of this
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journal, substantiated in the course of his career that philosophy in antiquity was not based primarily on the writings of wise men but rather on their way of life. Philosophy was a therapeutic practice -aiming at peace of mind, inner freedom, and cosmic consciousness -that would cure humankind of its anguish. 16 In the Middle Ages, however, schoolmen teaching at the newly founded European universities repurposed philosophical discourse as a conceptual basis for theology. Since the Occidental way of life had to be based on Christian faith, they turned philosophy into a purely theoretical activity, separated from the spiritual exercises of the classical pagans. Although philosophy, during the Enlightenment, emancipated itself from its role as "handmaid of theology," philosophy maintained its scholastic character as it became an academic discipline. As Hadot noted, "in modern university philosophy, philosophy is obviously no longer a . . . form of life -unless it be the form of life of a professor of philosophy. . . . Modern philosophy is first and foremost a discourse developed in the classroom, and then consigned to books." 17 Thus, philosophy departments were no place for revitalizing the old quest for peace of mind, inner freedom, and cosmic consciousness.
In the 1950s, these goals began to be pursued outside of the academy with the help of psychedelic drugs.
One of the reasons I have been interested in Metzinger's work, both philosophically and ethnographically, is that it does not fit neatly into the theorydominated tradition of neurophilosophy exemplified by the Churchlands. Shaped by the German counterculture's experiments with daily living, Metzinger suggests introducing a sort of "driver's license" for the legal use of psychedelic compounds. 18 Having begun to practice meditation on a daily basis before he had set foot in Frankfurt's renowned department of philosophy, he advocates the inclusion of secular forms of meditation and autogenic training in school curricula. 19 Thus, Metzinger regards his scholarly engagement with brain research not only as a contribution to the empirically informed theory of mind but also as an attempt at bringing Cicero's conception of philosophy as cultura animi, a cultivation of the Schizophrenics had the misfortune of being exposed constantly to this higher reality, which psychedelic drugs allow one to peek at in lighter and spiritually wholesome doses.
In my book Neuropsychedelia, I have shown how this transpersonal philosophy of mind became key to nonacademic psychedelic philosophy. As some of the flower children of the 1960s set out on careers in science, they operationalized Huxley's account in one of the most reductionist experimental paradigms of contemporary biopsychiatric research. To this day, they use psychedelic drugs to modulate the "startle reflex" of mice and other rodents to better understand the biological basis of schizophrenia. Huxley assumed that religious consciousness technologies, from chanting to self-flagellation and from meditation to drug ingestion, opened a "cerebral reducing valve" and enabled a mystical experience that had informed religions of all times and places. This universal experiencecentered spirituality was at the heart of his rearticulation of Leibniz's perennial Although I encountered as many worldviews as I did researchers, I managed to distill one metaphysical form from their multifaceted perspectives and dubbed this ideal type "mystic materialism": a this-worldly mysticism that reveres not transcendence but biological life. Almost no one in the labs that I observed believed in a nonmaterial mind, let alone in Huxley's "mind at large," which was said to transcend the physical world. Still, many researchers with whom I spoke aligned themselves with mysticism, which -like materialism -emphasizes the metaphysical unity of the world. The coexistence of these ontological commitments is consistent when taking into consideration that the experience-centered forms of spirituality that have blossomed since the 1960s have disentangled mysticism from theist religion. What gave this materialism its mystical edge, initially, was an attitude that my interlocutors attributed to their psychedelic experiences: the pharmacologically induced dissolution of the self had taught them how dependent their sense of selfhood was on neurochemistry, and they associated these ecstatic states with various forms of detachment -detachment from themselves and from everyday concerns. They also learned to feel awe for the human brain and for the biotic world at large, which after all had enabled their wondrous experiences.
Renewing Perennial Philosophy
Neurophilosophy is a decidedly modern project; perennial philosophy is not.
While neurophilosophers see themselves as contributing to a historical break that separates a dingy past from a neuroscientifically enlightened future, perennial philosophy seeks to articulate a knowledge shared across all times. Both promote universalist conceptions of humankind, but neurophilosophers assume that human nature will be revealed only by modern science, whereas perennialists believe that, since time immemorial, humans have been in possession of an anthropological and cosmological understanding that they need to recover if they are to return to living the good life. Perhaps it is no accident that it was this philosophy that proved the most appealing to the aficionados of psychedelic drugs.
As the chemist Alexander Shulgin remarked after experimenting on himself with one of the numerous novel compounds he had derived from phenethylamine
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and tryptamine hallucinogens: "Funny, I'd forgotten that what comes to you when you take a psychedelic is not always a revelation of something new and startling; you're more liable to find yourself reminded of simple things you know and forgot you knew -seeing them freshly -old, basic truths that long ago became clichés, so you stopped paying attention to them." 27 Although the philosophia perennis is in no sense modern in its attitudes, it emerged as a response to the divisive nature of modernity. It is in this context that I also want to argue for the importance of neuroscience and neurophilosophy, which challenge convenient presuppositions by means of experimental findings. These disciplines can help us to decide whether the psychedelic experience is as epistemically vacuous as the hallucinations that it involves or whether, on the other hand, it opens doors of perception and enables new insights into our minds and even into the cosmos that we inhabit. Perennial philosophy will need much empirical research into its doctrines, including its presuppositions about mind and brain, into its historical development, and into the lives of those who have promoted it, if ever we should determine to assemble it anew as a cultura animi. Not inconceivably, we might pursue philosophy as a way of life that cultivates the soul not only with the help of seminars but also with the aid of psychedelic drugs. As an old-fashioned academic, however, my own hope is that students will continue to read books at home during their semester breaks.
